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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
DISTRICT COURT DIGESTS
WILLS - TESTAMENTARY TRUST PROVISIONS CONSTRU-
ED TO INCLUDE AS BENEFICIARIES CHILDREN BORN
AFTER DEATH OF TESTATOR DO NOT VIOLATE RULE
AGAINST RESTRAINING ALIENATION. - First National Bank
v. McGuire, District Court of the First Judicial District, Grand
Forks County, North Dakota, 0. B. Burtness, Judge.
This is a petition for the construction of provisions of a will.
Petitioner, trustee of the trust created by the will of the testator,
brings a petition to have certain provisions of the will construed.
Since the establishment of the trust, another child has been born
to the son of the deceased and she now claims the same benefits
under the trust as the other children who were living at the time
of the execution of the will and at the time of the death of the tes-
tator. The last born child was issue of the son's second marriage.
The pertinent provisions of the will are:
"(3) . . . to pay for the care, education, maintenance and sup-
port of the children of my mon, J. Earl McGuire, until the
death of said children or until they shall have attained their
majority, such sum or sums to be paid to the mother of said
children if she is living . . .'
"(5)_ Upon the death of said son, J. Earl McGuire, and if the
youngest of his sons and daughters shall have become of the
age of twenty five years, my said trustee shall distribute the
residue of said trust to the sons and daughters of my said son,
J. Earl McGuire, share and share alike . . ."
The Court held that the quoted language from the will is not
ambiguous and that the children the testator desired to help by
monthly payments from the trust as well as by final disposition
of the residue of the trust after the death of his son, were the
children of his son, regardless of when they might be born. The
testator's blood relationship would be the same to all of them.
Counsel for the three older children had indicated that provisions
for payments to the "mother" meant mother of children in being
at the time the will was executed. The Court felt that the use of
the word "sons and daughters" when there was only one son and
two daughters living at the time will was executed was indicative
of the intent of the testator to provide for all the children of his
son. The children were therefore to be considered as a class rather
than as individuals with nossession or use postponed to a
future period. T h i s construction is not inconsistent with
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section 56-0521 of N.D.R.C. of 1943 providing that "[W]hen
possession is postponed to a future period it includes also all
persons coming within the description before the time to which
possession is postponed."
Counsel for the three older children also contended that to per-
mit the child born after the testator's death to share in the trust
would be a violation of the rule against restraining alienation under
section 47-0227 of the 1953 Supplement to the Revised Code. That
section provides that "[A]lienation cannot be suspended by any
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during
the continuance of the lives of persons in being at the creation
of the limitation or condition and twenty-one years." The Court,
repeating the holding in Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799 (N.D.
1955) that "in this state we have no statute against perpetuities and
that the common law against them is not in force in this state" was
of the opinion that the inclusion of the child under the trust did not
actually violate the statute against restraining alienation. Many
of the cases found in the books enforcing the rule against perpe-
tuities cannot apply to this case. The Court therefore relied on
In re Murphy's Estate, 43 P.2d 233 (Mont. 1935) which dealt with
statutory provisions similar to ours, and distinguished between the
rule against perpetuities and statutory provisions. In re Earle's
Estate, 85 A.2d 90 (Pa. 1951) on which the Court seemed to base
their holding deals with the possibility of a minor living beyond the
date of the trust termination and holds that the minor is at least en-
titled to an income for his life or until the termination of the trust.
That case further holds that the possibility of his living beyond the
date of the trust termination is not a controlling factor and that a
court need not speculate nor then pass on what may happen if var-
ious contingencies occur. This case was similar to the instant one
in facts.
Therefore in following that opinion the Court held that no
statutory provision is violated by the inclusion of the last born
minor child as a beneficiary under the will.
OIL AND GAS-SALE OF LAND BY COUNTY, SUBSEQUENT
TO PRIOR MINERAL LEASE OF WHICH NO NOTICE WAS
GIVEN TO FORMER OWNER, CONVEYS ENTIRE INTEREST
TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER. - Holbeck v. Hull, District
Court of the Fifth Judicial District, McKenzie County, North Da-
kota, Eugene A. Burdick, Judge.
1957]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Land had originally been obtained by McKenzie County from
J. Y. Hull by virtue of tax title proceedings. Approximately eight
years later McKenzie County executed and delivered to Thomas
Dorough an oil, gas and mineral lease. Incident to the execution
of this oil and gas lease, the county officials failed to transmit to
the former owner a notice advising him of the proposed oil and
gas lease and giving the former owner thirty days in which to
effect a repurchase. (Laws 1939, Ch. 238. Ulrich v. Amerada Pe-
troleum Corp., - N.D.- , 66 N.W.2d 397.) Dorough then exe-
cuted a Transfer of Lease to the Texas Company. Thereafter, Ivan
Murray made application to purchase the land from McKenzie
County. Notice was given to Hull of the pending sale to Murray.
Hull failed to repurchase the lands and a "County Deed to Pur-
chase" was issued to Murray, reserving 50% of the minerals to the
county. Murray thereafter brought action to quiet title, naming
Hull and "all other persons unknown" as defendants. There was
no appearance by any defendant and judgment was entered
quieting the title of Murray. Subsequently, Murray conveyed the
lands in controversy to the United States "subject to the exception
of 50% of oil, gas and minerals underlying said land received
by McKenzie County in its deed to Ivan Murray." Plaintiff was
lessee under an oil and gas lease executed by the United States.
Plaintiff contends the United States acquired a full mineral
estate in the lands in controversy. The heirs of Hull, deceased,
claim the right to repurchase the leasehold estate in oil and gas
because the lease issued to Dorough and held by the Texas Com-
pany is voidable so long as the required thirty day notice has not
been given to the former owner. Murray claims an undivided half
interest in the mineral estate by reason of the "exceptions" con-
tained in his deed to the United States.
The Court, deciding the question of the validity of the oil and
gas lease issued to Dorough and assigned to the Texas Company,
held that the lease, voidable for failure to give notice to the former
owner during the time McKenzie County owned the fee, became
void when the lands were sold to Murray, a stranger to the title.
The Court felt that since Hull, the former owner, could have re-
purchased either the mineral interest or the entire fee, the notice
given to the former owner upon the sale of the entire fee to Murray
was sufficient. However, in the Court's language, "There would
be little justice in holding that the notice given to the former
owner upon the sale of the entire fee to Murray should serve to
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satisfy the requirement of notice with respect to the oil and gas
lease and at the same time diminish the interest purchased by
Murray. Irregularity in the sale to Dorough should not be gratuit-
ously rewarded with the cloak of legality at the expense of Murray."
Therefore the sale of lands by McKenzie County to Murray was
effective to convey the entire fee to Murray, nothwithstanding the
purported reservation of an undivided one half interest in oil, gas
and other minerals. Kopplin v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 942,
47 N.W.2d 137, State v. California, 56 N.W.2d 762.
The Court, answyering next the question of the effect of the
exception of 50 per cent of the minerals in Murray's deed to the
United States, said that the language used by Murray in the
provision did not operate as a conveyance of any interest to
McKenzie County. See Tiffany Real Property, 3rd ed. Sec. 974,
26 C.J.S., Deeds, Sec. 140(3); and 16 Am. Jur., Deeds, Sec. 299.
Therefore, the effect of the exception depends on the intention of
the grantor as gathered from the four corners of the instrument.
See Rose v. Cook, 250 P.2d 848 (Okla.); 26 C.J.S., Deeds, Sec. 84.
See also Mitchell v. Nicholson, 71 N.D. 521, 3 N.W.2nd 83. Con-
sidering all the circumstances, the Court concluded that "[B]y the
use of the provision in controversy contained in the deed to the
United States of America, Murray did not intend to except from
its operation any part of the oil, gas, or other minerals." The Court
thought it significant that the grantor, Murray, did not purport
to make the exception in his favor, but rather to except the mineral
interest supposedly retained by McKenzie County in its deed
to Murray. However, as previously noted, McKenzie County
"received" no mineral interest by virtue of the deed. The entire
mineral interest thus passed to the plaintiff, Holbeck, under the oil
and gas lease executed by the United States.
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